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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' the collective
bargaining representative, selected by a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit, becomes the exclusive representative of all of the
employees in the unit.2  The common assumption that the union can
represent and bind only those employees who voluntarily join the union is
erroneous. National labor policy is predicated upon the principle of
* Joseph S. Platt - Porter, Wright, Morris and Arthur Professor of Law, The Ohio
State University College of Law. B.A., Antioch College, 1955; J.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1960. Portions of this article had their origins in Lee M. Modjeska, The
Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 807 (1977).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988) (Wagner Act). The National Labor Relations Act was
amended in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988), and again in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988). See
generally JANICE R. BELLACE & ALAN D. BERKOwiTz, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT:
TWENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTS (1979);
ARCHIBALD COX, CASES ON LABOR LAW 8-152 (4th ed. 1958); CLARK 0. GREGORY &
HAROLD A. KArZ, LABOR AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1979); JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POITICS AND THE
LAW 1933-1937 (1974); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937-1947 (1981); DOS B.
MCLAUGHLIN & ANITA L.W. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION
DEMOCRACY (1979); BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1-34 (3d ed. 1985); HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY C.
BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950); CLYDE W. SUMMERS &
HARRY H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 326-39 (1968). See also
Charles M. Rehmus, Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Railroad
and Airline Industries, in THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AT FIFTY I (Charles M. Rehmus ed.,
1977).
2. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975). See generally George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the
Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897
(1975).
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majority rule,' and the vote by a simple majority of the unit employees
(i.e., 51%) for representation commits the minority (i.e., 49%) to such
representation. As stated by the Supreme Court, this grant of exclusive
representative status places "a nonconsenting minority under the
bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a majority of the
workers."
4
National labor policy grants the exclusive representative awesome
power over all bargaining unit employees. This policy extinguishes the
power of the individual employee to order his or her employment relations
with the employer, and vests this power in the union representative. Only
the union may contract for the employee's wages, hours, and working
conditions, and the employee is bound thereby. Employee disagreement
with union bargaining decisions is legally irrelevant, for federal law does
not require majority ratification of the contract!
The contract negotiated between the employer and the union
representative becomes the collective agreement which governs the unit,
and under this principle of exclusivity, individual employment contracts
must yield to the collective agreement. 6 Whether or not the individual
employee might strike a better deal is irrelevant. In theory, the collective
agreement reflects strength and bargaining power and thereby better
3. Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms
of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be
present at such adjustment.
NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1946) (elaboration of majority rule
principle embodied in section 9(a)).
4. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954). See generally William H. Neary, The
Union's Loss of Majority Status and the Employer's Obligation to Bargain, 36 TEX. L. REV.
878 (1958); Joseph R. Weeks, The Union's Mid-Contract Loss of Majority Support: A
Wavering Presumption, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (1984).
5. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980); Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective
Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984).
6. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). See generally Derek C. Bok,
Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394,
1426-27 (1971); Herbert Schreiber, The Origin of the Majority Rule and Simultaneous
Development of Institutions to Protect the Minority: A Chapter in Early American Labor
Law, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 237 (1971); Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective
Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556 (1945).
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serves the welfare of the group. The United States Supreme Court has
noted that "Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative
with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body, both to
create and to restrict the rights of those whom it represents. .... "7
The union's representational exclusivity extends not only to
negotiation of the basic contract, but also to all other aspects of the
collective bargaining process, including administration and enforcement of
the contract. In particular, the union thereby controls the grievance and
arbitration procedure, and determines whether and to what extent
employees may seek redress of grievances. Through its federal grant of
exclusivity, the union thus controls the day to day work life of the
individual.
Serious questions of constitutionality would arise were this federal
grant of exclusivity unlimited. To counter such concerns, the duty of fair
representation was judicially created. The Supreme Court, and later the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), held, essentially, that the right
of exclusivity carries with it the correlative statutory duty to fairly
represent all employees in the bargaining unit.'
Over the years the duty of fair representation has become a major
"part of federal labor policy,"9 which "has stood as a bulwark to prevent
arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of
redress by the provisions of federal labor law.""° The essence of fair
representation doctrine was created, and continues to be shaped by the
Supreme Court, and this article reviews that jurisprudential evolution."
7. Steele v. Louisville & N.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
8. See Steele v. L. & N.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Teamsters (Ind.) Local 553
(Miranda Fuel Co., Inc.), 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963). See generally Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L.
REv. 151 (1957); William P. Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Tafi-Hartley,
30 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1965).
9. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 78-
79 (1989).
10. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
11. See generally Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in
the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633; Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the
Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7 (1988).
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II. NATURE OF THE DUTY
A. Origins of the Doctrine - the Railway Labor Act Cases
The duty of fair representation was initially developed by the
Supreme Court in a series of racial discrimination cases arising under the
Railway Labor Act (RLA). In the lead case, Steele v. Louisville &
N.R., ' 2 the union was the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft
unit of railroad firemen. A black minority within the unit was excluded
from membership. The black employees were given neither notice nor
opportunity to be heard concerning agreements negotiated by the union
and the employer that substantially controlled the seniority rights of black
employees and restricted their employment opportunities. Indeed, at the
outset of the negotiations the union advised the employer of the union's
desire to amend the contract so as ultimately to exclude all black firemen
from service. The Court held that the black firemen could maintain an
action, grounded in federal law, against the union for breach of the
statutory duty to represent and act for all members of the craft, as well as
an action against the employer who purported to act upon the basis of a
proscribed agreement. Appropriate remedies for breach of the duty could
include injunctive relief and damages.13
The Court noted that under the RLA, employees have the right to
bargain through representatives of their choosing; that the majority have
the right to determine the representative; that the representative bargains
for working conditions applicable to the entire class of employees; and
that a representative is defined, in part, as any union designated by the
employees to act for them. In the Court's view, this use of the term
.representative" in the statute implied that the representative must act on
behalf of all of the employees it represents. The Court further noted that
the Act imposes a duty upon the employer to bargain exclusively with the
majority representative, and that the minority members are thus barred by
the statute from choosing their own representative or from bargaining
individually with the employer. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
Court, concluded that "[t]he fair interpretation of the statutory language is
that the organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its
12. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
13. See Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949) (injunctive relief for breach of the duty of fair representation not barred by the anti-
injunction prohibitions of the Norris-La Guardia Act).
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members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not
against those whom it represents. "'4 The bargaining representative's duty
of equal representation was seen as at least as exacting as that imposed
upon the legislature by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
By thus finding an equal protection standard in the statute, the Court
avoided constitutional problems.
The Steele Court further stated that the Act imposes upon a
bargaining representative "the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred
upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile
discrimination."'s While noting that a representative is not barred from
making contracts that might have unfavorable effects on some of the unit
employees, and that variations based on "relevant" differences (e.g.,
seniority, skill, type of work) are permissible, it held that
"discriminations" among unit members based on the obviously irrelevant
and invidious basis of race were impermissible. 6
Steele arose in a state court. In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 7 a companion case to Steele, the
Court held that the duty of fair representation imposed by the RLA was a
federal right arising under a law regulating commerce and was thus within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Court stated that the duty "is a
federal right implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted"
and that it is "the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the
[union's] conduct.""
Steele mandated fair representation for the entire bargaining unit.
The Supreme Court thereafter extended the RLA duty of fair
representation beyond minority members of the particular craft unit
represented by the union. In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,"
the union, exclusively representative of white brakemen, forced the
employer to agree to discharge black train porters who performed the
same duties as white brakemen but who had been treated by the employer
and the union as a separate class for representation purposes, and who had
been represented by another union. The Court held that the union's racial
discrimination against noncraft members was nevertheless proscribed by
the statutory duty. The Court found that the end result of the transactions
involved was that the black train porters were threatened with loss of their
14. Steele v. Louisville & N.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
15. Id. at 202-03.
16. See generally Julia P. Clark, The DAy of Fair Representation: A Theoretical
Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973).
17. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
18. Id. at 213.
19. 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
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jobs solely on grounds of race, that, as in Steele, discriminations based on
race were irrelevant and invidious and unauthorized by Congress, and that
"[tihe Federal Act thus prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from
using their position and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in order
to bestow them on white workers. And courts can protect those
threatened by such an unlawful use of power granted by a federal act."2
Steele applied to contract negotiations. Subsequent decisions made
clear that the bargaining representative's duty of fair representation under
the RLA is not confined to contract negotiations but extends to the daily
administration of the contract as well, including the processing of
grievances. In Conley v. Gibson,2' for example, the Supreme Court held
that a union could not refuse to bargain or process grievances for
employees upon the basis of race. The Court rejected the proposition that
the duty of fair representation comes to an "abrupt end" with the signing
of the contract. Collective bargaining is a continuing process, said the
Court, involving daily adjustments in the contract and work rules,
resolution of new problems, and protection of contract rights. "The
bargaining representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying
out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. A
contract may be fair and impartial on its face yet administered in such a
way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly
discriminatory against some members of the bargaining unit. "2
B. Evolution of the Doctrine - Application to the National Labor
Relations Act
Steele found a federal duty of fair representation in the Railway
Labor Act (RLA). The Supreme Court subsequently found the same duty
in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffinan,'3 the union and the employer negotiated an agreement which
gave pre-employment seniority credit for military service, a benefit in
excess of the selective service law requirement that employees be given
seniority credit for military service occurring subsequent to their
employment. The plaintiff, representing a class of veteran and nonveteran
employees whose seniority ran from the dates of their employment,
claimed that but for the super-seniority granted by the negotiated
provisions, he and others would not have been laid off or furloughed.
20. Id. at 774.
21. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
22. Id. at 46.
23. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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Plaintiff contended that by negotiating these provisions, the union
exceeded its authority under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court held generally, that the duty of fair
representation was applicable to unions covered by the NLRA,u and noted
particularly, that the Act reflected Congress' faith in free collective
bargaining conducted by a freely and fairly chosen representative. The
Court noted further that in Steele it had been recognized that the authority
of the bargaining representative is not absolute, and that "[t]heir statutory
obligation to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires them to
make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those members,
without hostility to any."2s
The duty does not preclude the representative from negotiating
agreements that prefer one group over another, said the Ford Motor
Court, as long as the differences are predicated upon "reasonable grounds
of relevancy." The Court recognized that compromise is a natural
incident of negotiation. The Court stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and
classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences
does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who
are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of
reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion.'
Differences in employment terms reflect many variables, said the
Court, and seniority variations need not be based solely upon employment
services but might well encompass time devoted to public service such as
the military.Y Finding that the pre-employment service credit was
consistent with both public policy and fairness as embodied in federal
selective service and veteran preference laws, and thus "within reasonable
bounds of relevancy, "2 the Court concluded that the union had the
authority to accept the negotiated provisions.
24. See also Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (discrimination against
rival union members in bargaining unit).
25. 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). See also Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S.
892 (1955), rev'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955) (duty applicable even where all
employees in unit are union members).
26. 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
27. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949).
28. 345 U.S. 330, 342 (1953).
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The legitimacy of reasonable compromise was further validated by
the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Moore, 9 which arose in the context of
an amalgamation of two separate businesses whose employees were
represented by the same union. The Court held that the union did not
breach its duty of fair representation by agreeing with the employer to
dovetail the seniority lists. The union's action was predicated upon its
view that the contract authorized the resolution. The Court found that
the union "took its position honestly, in good faith and without hostility or
arbitrary discrimination" and that by "choosing to integrate seniority lists
based upon length of service at either company, the union acted upon
wholly relevant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors."30
The Court rejected the contention that the union could not fairly
represent the antagonistic interests of the two groups of employees,
stating:
But we are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining
agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position
contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in
supporting the position of one group of employees against that of
another. . . . Just as a union must be free to sift out wholly
frivolous grievances which would only clog the grievance process,
so it must be free to take a position on the not so frivolous
disputes. Nor should it be neutralized when the issue is chiefly
between two sets of employees. Conflict between employees
represented by the same union is a recurring fact. To remove or
gag the union in these cases would surely weaken the collective
bargaining and grievance processes.3'
C. Further Evolution - Creation of an Unfair Labor Practice
The foregoing traces judicial development of the duty of fair
representation as a civil right.3 Under the RLA and NLRA, the union, as
exclusive bargaining representative, has a statutory duty to represent all
employees in the bargaining unit fairly, both in collective bargaining with
the employer and in enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.
A union breaches that duty when it acts against a unit employee for
29. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
30. Id. at 350.
31. Id. at 349.
32. See generally Clark, supra note 16; Cox, supra note 8; Murphy, supra note 8;
Michael I. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 563 (1962); Harry H. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation:
Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327 (1958). See also Karl E.
Kare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives
From Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982).
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arbitrary or discriminatory reasons, or in bad faith. Suits by an employee
against a union for breach of the duty are cognizable by federal and state
courts with remedies including damages and injunction.
Almost twenty years after Steele, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB)P announced in Teamsters and.) Local 553 (Miranda Fuel
Co.)m the "novel, if not quite revolutionary, "3 proposition that breach of
the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA.' Looking to Steele and its progeny, the Board found that the
duty of fair representation imposed upon an exclusive bargaining agent
under the Act, when viewed in the context of the section 7 right of
employees "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing,"37 means that section 7 "gives employees the right to be free
from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive
bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment. "3 Reasoning that
"[t]his right of employees is a statutory limitation on statutory bargaining
representatives," the Board concluded that "[s]ection 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
33. The NLRB performs two distinct functions under the NLRA: (1) the prevention
and remedying of unfair labor practices; (2) the determination of questions concerning
employee representation (e.g., elections). See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In performing these functions the Board
represents public rather than private rights. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 193 (1941) (Board acts "in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy
of the Act"); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 363 (1940) (Board proceedings
"narrowly restricted to the protection and enforcement of public rights"); Amalgamated Util.
Workers, 309 U.S. at 265 (Board is "a public agency acting in the public interest"). See
generally LEE M. MODIESKA, NLRB PRACTICE §§ 1.8-1.14 (1983).
The General Counsel of the NLRB has sole authority and unreviewable discretion
concerning the issuance and settlement of unfair labor practice complaints. See NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 (1987); Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 687 (1965); Sparks v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1987); Saez v. Goslee, 463
F.2d 214, 214-15 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
34. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1963).
36. See generally Jeffrey M. Albert, NILRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1963);
Bernard D. Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The
More Remedies, The Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1974); Lee M. Modjeska, The
Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38 OHIO ST. L. 807 (1977); Betty S. Murphy, NLRB,
the EEOC, and Baby Makes Three: Today's Concerns - Problems or Solutions for
Tomorrow, in N.Y.U. THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 191 (Richard
Adelman ed., 1979); Herbert L. Sherman, Jr., Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1964); Michael I. Sovern, Race
Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, in
N.Y.U. SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (Thomas G.S. Christensen ed.,
1963).
37. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) guarantees to employees the
rights to organize and join unions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
38. 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
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accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory
representative capacity, from taking action against any employee based
upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or
unfair.""
The Board also noted in Miranda Fuel that while a union, as
statutory bargaining representative, has obligations to employees that
employers do not, employer participation in a union's arbitrary action
against an employee nevertheless violates section 8(a)(1).4 The Board
39. Id. §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, protect fundamental § 7 rights (see
supra n.37) against union interference. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). See Helton v.
NLRB, 656 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights. E.g.,
Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (fining strikebreaking members who
have tendered resignations); Mine Workers, Local 7244 (Grundy Mining Co.), 146
N.L.R.B. 244 (1964) (assaults on uncooperative or dissident employees); NLRB v. Indus.
Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968) (disciplining members for
filing charges); International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)
(entering into "sweetheart" minority union contracts); cf. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974) (fining strikebreaking supervisor-
members for performing unit work); NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960)
(peaceful picketing).
Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee to encourage or discourage union
membership (i.e., in violation of section 8(a)(3)). E.g., NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365
U.S. 695 (1961); Teamsters, Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (union membership considerations).
40. Sections 8(a)(l) through (4) generally protect fundamental § 7 rights (see supra
note 37) against employer interference. Thus, § 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). E.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (broad
restrictions on union solicitation and distribution of literature); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969) (threats of reprisal); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405
(1964) (promises of economic benefit); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (surveillance of union meetings); Strucksnes
Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (interrogation concerning union sympathies or
activities).
Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of employee labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1982). E.g., International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961) ("sweetheart" recognition of minority unions); Abraham Grossman (Bruckner Nursing
Home), 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982) (breaches of neutrality during election proceedings);
Hertzka & Knowles, 206 N.L.R.B. 191 (1973), enforcement denied, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir.
1974), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975) (creation of captive company unions); Nassau
& Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957) (undue involvement in internal
union affairs).
Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
against an employee to encourage or discourage union membership. E.g., Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (discharge of union activists); Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) (disproportionate discipline of union officials); NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (nonpayment of accrued benefits for strikers);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Co., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (excessive super-seniority for
strikebreakers); Local 57, Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967) (runaway shops).
Section 8(a)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
against an employee for filing charges or giving testimony under the Act. E.g., NLRB v.
Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972) (discharge for giving sworn statements to NLRB
investigators); Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967) (discharge for
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further concluded that a union violates section 8(b)(2), and an employer
violates section 8(a)(3), when a union causes or attempts to cause an
employer to derogate the employment status of an employee for arbitrary
or irrelevant reasons, or because of an unfair classification. 4' Applying
this set of principles in Miranda Fuel, the Board found that because the
union caused an employee's seniority reduction in violation of the contract
and pursuant to the unjustified pressure of certain union employees, the
union had no legitimate union purpose and interfered with the employee's
right to fair and impartial treatment.
Miranda Fuel was denied enforcement by the Second Circuit.C
The court held that sections 8(b)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), were
violated only when the union or employer conduct is predicated upon
union considerations. In the court's view, discrimination based upon
filing charges with NLRB).
The foregoing sections, 8(a)(1)-(4) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) "form a web" (Scofield
v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1969)) designed to prevent employer and union intrusions
upon the various employee organizational, representational, and other concerted activities
protected by section 7.
41. The Board subsequently held that the duty of fair representation was included in the
union's duty to bargain collectively under §§ 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act. See Local 1367,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n), 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964),
enforced, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967) (union
violated section 8(b)(3) by the contractual establishment, maintenance and enforcement of
racially discriminatory work apportionment provisions).
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) respectively, as amplified by section 8(d), make it an
unfair labor practice for an employer or union to refuse to bargain with the other in good
faith concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) and (d)
(1982). See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Cf., Allied Chemical & Alkali
Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (permissive subjects
of bargaining); NLRB v. Houston Maritime Ass'n, 337 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1964) (illegal
subjects of bargaining). See generally Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith,
71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner
to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REv. 1447
(1982).
The following are illustrative of the type of conduct proscribed by sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(b)(3): First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (unilateral
action); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1956) (refusal to furnish relevant information); NLRB v. Milgo Indus., Inc.,
567 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1977) (sham bargaining); Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964) (failure to observe statutory contract
modification and termination notice and waiting period requirements); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953)
(failing to reach a reasonable agreement with the union); Clear Pine Moldings, Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. 69 (1978), affd, 632 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981)
(improperly interrogating and reprimanding employees); Case Inc. and Upper South Dept.,
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 237 N.L.R.B. 798 (1978), af 'd in part and rev'd in
part, 653 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1981); Nassau Glass Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 476 (1972); West
Coast Casket Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 624 (1971), enforced, 469 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1972)
(maintaining a fixed resolve not to reach agreement); NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 147
N.L.R.B. 145 (1964), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 345 F.2d 494 (7th
Cir. 1965), and cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965).
42. Miranda Fuel, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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reasons unrelated to union membership, loyalty, acknowledgement of
union authority, or performance of union obligations, was not sufficient to
establish violations. Rather, there must be an intent and purpose, or a
deliberate design, of encouraging or discouraging union membership. The
Second Circuit concluded that the unfair labor practice machinery of the
Board was "not suited to the task of deciding general questions of private
wrongs, unrelated to union activities, suffered by employees as a result of
tortious conduct by either employers or labor unions."4 Notwithstanding
the court's rejection, the Board has continued to apply and expand upon
the Board's Miranda Fuel doctrine. In the Board's view, "With due
deference to the circuit court's opinion, we adhere to our previous
decision until such time as the Supreme Court of the United States rules
otherwise. "
Subsequent to Miranda Fuel, the Supreme Court made clear in
Vaca v. Sipes s that the Board's "tardy assumption of jurisdiction in these
cases" does not preempt federal and state court jurisdiction over suits for
breach of the duty of fair representation. 46 The Court also reaffirmed an
employee's right to maintain a section 301 action in federal court against
an employer for wrongful discharge in breach of contract even if the
employer's conduct is arguably an unfair labor practice within the Board's
43. Id. at 180.
44. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, supra note 41, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 898,
n.7 (1964).
45. 386 U.S. 171, 183 (1967).
46. Under traditional labor law preemption doctrine, summarized as refined in San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the states (and the federal
courts) lack jurisdiction when the activity is protected by § 7 of the NLRA or prohibited by
§ 8. "To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of
federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law." Id. at 244. Moreover, even where the
activity is arguably, though not clearly, subject to §§ 7 and 8, the state and federal courts
must defer to the exclusive primary competence of the NLRB for determination of the
activity's legal status. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
The federal regulatory scheme also leaves some activities and practices to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces. Accordingly, a second line of preemption
analysis focuses upon and preempts conduct which Congress intended to leave either entirely
uncontrolled and/or immune from state (or federal court) regulation. See Lodge 76, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
A third line of preemption analysis, predicated upon § 301 of the NLRA (see infra
note 55), preempts state rules purporting to define the meaning or scope of labor contract
terms, including noncontractual state rights dependent upon or intertwined with the labor
contract. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
See generally Lee M. Modjeska, Federalism in Labor Relations - The Last Decade,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 487 (1989).
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jurisdiction." (As discussed later, the union's breach of its duty of fair
representation removes the exclusivity of the contractual remedy as to the
employer.)4
A principal basis for preemption is the need to entrust primary
administrative authority to the Board in order to avoid conflicting rules of
law between court and Board. 4 In Vaca, the Court found no such basis
because in the Court's view the Board was simply adopting the fair
representation doctrine as it had been judicially developed. Thus, the
Court found that "when the Board declared in Miranda Fuel that a union's
breach of its duty of fair representation would henceforth be treated as an
unfair labor practice, the Board adopted and applied the doctrine as it had
been developed by the federal courts..so The Supreme Court has not yet
47. E.g., Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). See Carey v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964). Section 301 provides that suits for
violation of labor-management contracts may be brought in federal court. 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1988). See generally Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
Sections 9 and 10 of the NLRA clearly vest the NLRB with jurisdiction over unfair
labor practice and representation matters, whether or not such matters also involve breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421
(1967); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). See also Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
Section 10(a) specifically provides that the Board's power "shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or
otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). In recognition of congressional encouragement and
support for private arbitration of disputes arising under labor contracts, however, the NLRB
over the years generally has declined to exercise jurisdiction concerning unfair labor practice
or representation questions which had been or could have been submitted to arbitration under
the contract. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Olin Corp. and
Local 8-77, 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). See generally Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators and the
NLRB: The Nature of the Deferral Beast, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 587 (1981); Michael C.
Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part II A Fresh Approach to
Board Deferral of Arbitration, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 680 (1981); Dennis 0. Lynch, Deferral,
Waiver and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U.
MAMI L. REV. 237 (1989); Calvin W. Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance-Arbitration: A
General Theory, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 595 (1987).
48. E.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
49. See generally William C. Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law
Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1037 (1973); Norton J. Come, Federal
Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435 (1970); Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Archibald Cox, Recent Developments in Federal
Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); James C. Kirby, Jr., Federal
Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 128 (1968); Howard Lesnick,
Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffinnation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 469
(1972); Allan H. McCoid, Notes on a "G-String : A Study of the 'No Man's Land" of
Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REV. 205 (1959); Bernard D. Meltzer, The Supreme Court,
Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations Ots. I & If), 59 COLUM. L. REv. 6,
269 (1959); Frank I. Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74
HARv. L. REv. 641 (1961); Lee M. Modjeska, Federalism in Labor Relations - The Last
Decade, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 487 (1989).
50. 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967). See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964).
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squarely passed upon the substantive validity of the Board's Miranda Fuel
doctrine. s1
In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n, Local
Union No. 6,s the Supreme Court held that federal courts have
jurisdiction over fair representation claims arising from hiring hall
nonreferral. Vaca made clear that state and federal court jurisdiction
were not preempted by the fact that breach of the duty of fair
representation constituted an unfair labor practice, subject to NLRB
jurisdiction, and the Board's alleged hiring hall expertise did not warrant
an exception to Vaca. Vaca nonpreemption does not turn on the nature of
the particular claim, said the Breininger Court, and "[w]e are unwilling to
begin the process of carving out exceptions now, especially since we see
no limiting principle to such an approach. "
The Breininger Court noted that NLRB jurisprudence extended to
many areas encompassed by the duty of fair representation, and that
"[aldopting a rule that NLRB expertise bars federal jurisdiction would
remove an unacceptably large number of fair representation claims from
federal courts."' While certain state law claims arising from hiring hall
arrangements and entailing tort, contract, and other substantive nonfederal
law claims might be preempted, the duty of fair representation "is part of
federal labor policy" and creates no substantive conflicts.-
The Breininger Court also held that fair representation claims were
not delimited by unfair labor practice conduct (e.g., union-related
discrimination under sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)) but rather were
potentially broader in scope. Flexibility and adaptability were virtues of
the doctrine in protecting employees. "The duty of fair representation is
not intended to mirror the contours of § 8(b); rather, it arises
51. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S.
67 (1989). See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 71-72, n.25 (1975); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
52. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
53. Id. at 76.
54. Id.
55. Id. Cf. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state
court tort action for retaliatory discharge for asserting rights under workers' compensation
laws by employee covered by just cause provisions of labor contract, not preempted by
federal labor contract law under § 301); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481
U.S. 851 (1987) (state court negligence action against union, predicated upon alleged duty of
care arising from labor contract's safety and working requirement provisions, preempted by
§ 301); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state court tort action against
employer and insurer for bad faith handling of claim under nonoccupational disability
insurance plan incorporated in labor contract preempted by § 301).
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independently from the grant under § 9(a) . .. of the union's exclusive
power to represent all employees in a particular bargaining unit." 6
M. THE STANDARD REFINED
Excessive judicial or administrative oversight of union judgment
would intrude upon the enclaves reserved for legitimate collective
bargaining and internal union affairs. Conversely, federal labor policy
hardly sanctions arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory union
representation. In Vaca v. Sipes,s7 the Supreme Court sought to refine a
balanced standard for application of the duty of fair representation.
In Vaca, the Court made clear that union breach of the duty of fair
representation is not established merely by showing union error or a
meritorious grievance. There must be arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad
faith union conduct. Stated differently, the fact that the employer may
indeed have violated the contract and wronged the employee is not
determinative.
Vaca involved an employee's state court suit alleging that the union
breached its duty of fair representation by refusing to take to arbitration
the employee's grievance for wrongful discharge in violation of the labor
contract. The union refused to process the grievance to arbitration
because in the union's view the medical evidence was insufficient to prove
the employee's fitness for work. The Court stressed that there was no
evidence that any of the union officers were personally hostile to the
employee or that the union acted other than in good faith. The Court held
56. 493 U.S. 67, 86 (1989). In Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489
U.S. 527 (1989), the Supreme Court held that no private cause of action existed for federal
employees against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation under Title VII of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988). Rather, exclusive
enforcement authority over this duty was vested in the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA) and its General Counsel. Because Title VII expressly makes breach of the duty of
fair representation an unfair labor practice and provides for its administrative enforcement,
there is no need to imply a judicial cause of action.
We also note that Vaca rested in part on the fact that private collective-
bargaining contracts were enforceable in the federal courts under LMRA §
301. Because unfair representation claims most often involve a claim of
breach by the employer and since employers are suable under § 301, the
implied fair representation cause of action allows claims against an
employer and a union to be adjudicated in one action. Section 301 has no
equivalent under Title VII; there is no provision in that Title for suing an
agency in federal court.
Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989).
57. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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that because the evidence did not show that the union acted arbitrarily or
in bad faith the union had not breached its duty. The Court emphasized
that an individual employee has no absolute right to have a grievance
arbitrated, and that breach of the duty of fair representation is not shown
simply by proof that the underlying grievance may have been meritorious.
Particular note should be taken of the standard of liability applied
by the state court and rejected by the Supreme Court in Vaca. The
question that the state court regarded as dispositive of the issue of liability
was whether the evidence supported the employee's assertion that he had
been wrongfully discharged by the employer, irrespective of the union's
good faith in taking a different view. The Supreme Court found that this
standard was inconsistent with governing principles of federal law
regarding a union's duty of fair representation, and that the plaintiff had
failed to prove a breach of that duty. The Court made clear that the
standard of liability was a much stricter one, namely, whether or not the
union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. The Court
stated:
[I]f a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient
merit to justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of
fair representation because a judge or jury later found the
grievance meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such
grievances short of arbitration would be seriously reduced. The
dampening effect on the entire grievance procedure of this
reduction of the union's freedom to settle claims in good faith
would surely be substantial."
The Supreme Court's rejection of the standard of liability applied
by the state court underscores the wide discretion accorded unions. To
reemphasize, the fact that the employer may have violated the contract
and wronged the employee is not determinative. The threshold issue is
whether or not there is arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith union
conduct. The clear assumption is that absent such union conduct the
employee will receive due process under the contractual grievance and
arbitration process.
More recently, the Court made clear that mere negligence does not
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 9 the Court held that federal labor
contract law under section 301 preempted a state court negligence action
alleging negligent mine inspection by the union. Whatever union duty
was entailed in the allegedly negligent mine inspection arose from the
58. Id. at 192-93.
59. 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990).
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labor contract safety committee provisions and was governed by federal
law.?
The Court also held that mere negligence would not support an
independent fair representation claim. The duty of fair representation is
an important but limited check on arbitrary union power, said the Court,
for a union must be accorded a wide range of representational
reasonableness. Further, no independent contractual undertaking existed
to warrant a third-party beneficiary section 301 claim against the union.
"If an employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching duty,
he must be able to point to language in the collective-bargaining
agreement specifically indicating an intent to create obligations enforceable
against the union by the individual employees."" The instant labor
contract ran between and was enforceable by the employer and the union,
not individual employees. Further, the safety provisions did not even
involve promises by the union to the employer, which might theoretically
create third-party beneficiary rights.
Fundamental questions concerning the nature and scope of the
Vaca standards of fair representation returned to the Court this past Term.
In Air Line Pilots Ass', International v. O'Neill," Continental Airlines
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. With the approval of the bankruptcy court, Continental repudiated
its collective bargaining agreement with the Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA) and thereafter unilaterally implemented cuts in the
pilots' salaries and benefits." Responding to the salary cuts, ALPA called
a strike, but Continental was able to continue to operate its airline by
trimming its operation, by accepting 400 "cross-overs" for employment,
and by hiring approximately 1,000 replacement pilots."
During the period of the strike and while a lawsuit was pending
against the airline,6' Continental posted a vacancy bid which gave the
pilots nine days to submit their bids for 441 future Captain and First
60. See Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202 (1985) (tort claims intertwined with contract interpretation preempted). See
generally supra note 55.
61. 110 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1990).
62. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, II1 S. Ct. 1127 (1991).
63. O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 886 F.2d 1438, 1440 (5th Cir. 1989) rev'd,
11 S. Ct. 1127 (1991). The concessions unilaterally implemented by Continental included
cuts of more than 50% in pilots' salaries and benefits. Id. at 1440.
64. Id. Although 1,800 of the 2,000 pilots employed by Continental originally
supported the strike, by August of 1985 Continental was operating with 1,600 pilots and
only 1,000 pilots were still on strike. Id.
65. In late August of 1985, Continental notified ALPA that it was withdrawing
recognition from ALPA as the authorized collective bargaining representative of the
Continental pilots. ALPA responded with a lawsuit challenging the legality of the
withdrawal of recognition. Id.
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Officer positions and an undetermined number of Second Officer
positions. Fearing that the vacancy bid might preclude the striking pilots
from getting jobs at Continental, ALPA authorized the striking pilots to
submit bids." Although initially accepting bids from both groups,
Continental challenged the strikers' bids in court and announced that all
vacancy bid positions had been awarded to working pilots. Responding to
Continental's announcement, ALPA intensified negotiations and reached
an agreement with Continental which gave the pilots the option to
participate in the vacancy bid positions if they would settle all outstanding
claims against Continentali 7 The vacancy bid positions would then be
allocated in the following manner: the first 100 Captain positions would
be allocated to working pilots, the next 70 Captain positions would be
allocated to first option striking workers in order of seniority, and
thereafter Captain positions would be allocated on a one-to-one basis.
After initial assignments, future changes in bases and equipment would be
determined in the usual manner, by seniority."
Several months after the settlement a group of past and present
Continental pilots (the "O'Neill Group") brought an action against ALPA
alleging, among other things, that ALPA had breached its duty of fair
representation in negotiating and accepting the settlement.6 ' ALPA then
moved for a summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. 0
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the summary
judgment was vacated and the case was remanded. 7' Applying the Vaca
v. Sipes:7 tripartite standard' and a refined definition of the "arbitrary
prong," 74 the court concluded that a jury could find that ALPA acted
66. Id. at 1441.
67. Id. at 1441-42. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the pilots had three options:
1) settle all outstanding claims with Continental and participate in the vacancy bid; 2) elect
not to return to work and receive a lump-sum severance payment; or 3) retain outstanding
claims against Continental and return to work only after first option pilots were reinstated.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1442.
70. Id.
71. O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 886 F.2d 1438, 1448-49 (5th Cir. 1989)
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991).
72. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
73. According to Vaca, "[A] breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs
only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190.
74. The court refined the arbitrary prong in the following manner by citing a prior 5th
Cireuit case:
We think a decision to be non-arbitrary must be (1) based upon relevant,
permissible union factors which excludes the possibility of it being based
upon motivations such as personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a
rational result of the consideration of these factors; and (3) inclusive of a
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arbitrarily in agreeing to a settlement that left the striking pilots worse off
than a complete surrender to Continental. 7s The court reasoned that if
ALPA had surrendered to all of Continental's demands, the strikers would
have been entitled to the vacancy bid positions based on their seniority.7 6
The court also found that the evidence raised a material issue of fact,
whether the favored treatment of the working pilots under the vacancy bid
allocation constituted discrimination against the striking pilots.7  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the appropriate standard
governing a union's duty of fair representation.7'
Before the Supreme Court, ALPA argued that the duty of fair
representation only required the union to act in good faith and in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 79  ALPA attempted to distinguish Vaca v.
Sipes, which also requires the union to act nonarbitrarily as the third
prong of the tripartite standard, on the ground that Vaca involved contract
administration or enforcement whereas the present action involved contract
negotiation."0  Relying heavily on language in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffinan" that "[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of
its discretion, " 2 ALPA argued that no substantive review of settlement
terms is permissible where the union has acted in good faith and with
honesty of purpose.3 ALPA also argued that a union owes no
enforceable duty of adequate representation because employees are
protected from inadequate representation by removing union officials
through the union political process.' 4
fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees.
O'Neill v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 886 F.2d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Tedford
v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added)).
75. Id. at 1448-49.
76. Id. at 1445-46.
77. Id. at 1446-47.
78. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1990).
79. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1991).
80. Id. at 1135. Cf. Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co., 845
F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1988) (under the Railway Labor Act, union conduct in negotiating a
labor contract should be subjected to a lesser standard of review in regard to the duty of fair
representation); Schultz v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 696 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (court
recognizes two separate standards in fair representation cases and permits a wide range of
reasonableness in contract negotiation cases).
81. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
82. Id. at 338.
83. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, I11 S. Ct. 1127, 1133 (1991).
84. Id. at 1134.
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Although accepting the general principle that courts should allow
the private parties to establish the terms of their private agreement, the
Supreme Court stated that an examination of the terms is required to
"search for evidence that a union did not fairly and adequately represent
its constituency."" Analogizing the union's duty of fair representation to
that of a legislature, 6 the Court noted that even a legislature is subject to
some judicial review of the rationality of its action. The Court concluded
that the appropriate level of review in the duty of fair representation
context was the Vaca v. Sipes tripartite standard, thus rejecting the
ALPA's argument that the "arbitrary prong" did not apply to unions in the
contract negotiation stage.87 Under Vaca, the union, as the exclusive
bargaining agent for the employees, is required to serve the interests of all
members "without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct. "u The Court rejected a contract administration/negotiation
distinction because none of their prior decisions had suggested that
contract negotiation should be measured by a lesser standard. Moreover,
the difficulty of establishing a bright line between contract administration
and contract negotiation weighed against using a double standard."9
Turning to the refinement of the "arbitrary prong" employed by
the court of appeals, the Court rejected the refinement because it
authorized more judicial review of the substantive terms of private
agreements than is consistent with national labor policy.9' Moreover, the
Court found that the court of appeals' approach failed to take into account
either the strong policy favoring the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
85. Id. at 1133.
86. Id. at 1134. The Court also analogized the duty of fair representation to the duty
owed by a fiduciary to its beneficiaries, to the relationship between the attorney and client,
and to the responsibilities of corporate officers and directors toward shareholders. Drawing
on this analogy, the Court stated that "[jlust as these fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a
duty of care as well as a duty of loyalty, a union owes employees a duty to represent them
adequately as well as honestly and in good faith." Id.
87. Id. at 1135.
88. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
89. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991). The Court
stated that "[w]e doubt ... that a bright line could be drawn between contract
administration and contract negotiation. Industrial grievances may precipitate settlement
negotiations leading to contract amendments, and some strikes and strike settlement
agreements may focus entirely on questions of contract interpretation." Id. The Court also
noted that certain union activities such as operating a hiring hall would not fall into either
category. Id. But cf. Dement v. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. Co., 845
F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1988) (under the Railway Labor Act, union conduct in negotiating a
labor contract should be subjected to a lesser standard of review in regard to the duty of fair
representation); Schultz v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 696 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (court
recognizes two separate standards in fair representation cases and permits a wide range of
reasonableness in contract negotiation cases).
90. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991).
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or the importance of evaluating the union's decision in light of the legal
and factual climate present at the time of the negotiation. Clarifying the
"arbitrary prong," the Court stated that "the final product of the
bargaining process may constitute evidence of a breach of duty only if it
can be fairly characterized as so far outside a 'wide range of
reasonableness,' . . . that it is wholly 'irrational' or 'arbitrary.'" 9'
Applying the Vaca tripartite standard, the Court concluded that
ALPA's negotiation of the settlement agreement was well within the wide
range of reasonableness allowed in the bargaining process, even assuming
that the union made a bad settlement. 92 The Court based this conclusion
on the legal and factual climate existing at the time of the settlement. At
that time, Continental had announced that all vacancy bid positions would
be awarded to nonstriking pilots. In addition, although the court of
appeals determined that the positions were still vacancies even after the
Continental announcement, the Court stated that the law was unclear about
whether striking pilots had a right to the positions based on seniority.Y
Given the background of Continental's resistance during the strike, the
Court found it rational for ALPA to conclude that a voluntary return to
work would precipitate more litigation over the vacancy bid positions.
Furthermore, the settlement provided prompt access to a share of new
jobs, avoided the costs and risks of major litigation, and provided a
presumably more advantageous result than a complete surrender to
Continental's pre-settlement terms for those pilots choosing the lump-sum
severance payment.9
The Court also rejected the breach of duty argument based on
discrimination between striking and working pilots. The Court reasoned
that, assuming that the acceptance of the settlement agreement was
rational, some form of allocation was inevitable." Moreover, unlike the
91. Id. at 1136.
92. Id. For purposes of its analysis, the Court assumed that the court of appeals was
correct in concluding that if ALPA had surrendered to Continental's pre-settlement terms,
the striking pilots would have been entitled to reemployment in the order of seniority.
Therefore, the Court assumed that ALPA made a settlement which was even worse than a
unilateral termination of the strike. Id. at 1136.
93. Id. The court of appeals determined that the positions were still vacancies based on
a separate lawsuit in which a federal district court had ruled that the bid positions were still
vacancies until pilots were trained and actually working in the positions. The Court
questioned the validity of this ruling, because it was being challenged on appeal. The Court
also questioned the court of appeals' conclusion that the striking pilots had a right to the bid
vacancies based on their seniority because the court of appeals had relied solely on National
Labor Relations Act cases. The Court stated that "[w]e have made clear, however, that
National Labor Relations Act cases are not necessarily controlling in situations, such as this
one, which are governed by the Railway Labor Act." Id. at 1137.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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grant of super-seniority in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,96 the settlement
agreement did not permanently alter the seniority system. Therefore, the
Court found that ALPA had not breached its duty of fair representation.Y
IV. SPECIAL PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Hybrid Lawsuit
An employee is normally bound by the grievance and arbitration
procedures of the collective bargaining agreement as to grievances covered
by that agreement. Any arbitration award (or pre-arbitration resolution)
arising out of the contractual process is normally final and binding. The
exclusivity of the contractual remedy therefore bars an independent action
(i.e., section 301) against the employer for breach of contract. The
contractual process does not, of course, bar an independent action or
unfair labor practice charge against the union for breach of the duty of
fair representation. An employee's independent action against the
employer under section 301 for breach of contract is not barred by the
otherwise exclusive contractual remedy where that contract procedure has
been tainted by the union's breach of its duty of fair representation."
As a general precondition to such hybrid lawsuits, the employee
must thus exhaust (or attempt to exhaust) contractual grievance and
arbitration procedures. 99 Further, the employee must also exhaust any
internal union review procedures which could reactivate the grievance or
award complete relief.'O Preliminary judicial determination of the
question of the union's breach of its duty is then, frequently required
before the section 301 suit against the employer can proceed." Thus,
whether or not the union is joined in the suit, the employer is often in the
somewhat anomalous position of defending the union's conduct.
96. 373 U.S. 221 (1963). While ALPA's settlement agreement "preserved the seniority
of the striking pilots after their initial reinstatement[,] [i]n Erie, the grant of extra seniority
enabled the replacement workers to keep their jobs while more senior strikers lost theirs
during a layoff subsequent to the strike." Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct.
1127, 1137 (1991).
97. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1137 (1991).
98. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
99. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
100. See Clayton v. International Union, United Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679
(1981).
101. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
[Vol. 7:1 1991]
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Nor is suit against the union barred by failure to allege an
employer breach of the labor contract. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers
International Ass'n, Local Union No. 6,"2 made clear that while a
substantial jurisprudence has developed concerning hybrid fair
representation/breach of contract claims where the employee elects to sue
both employer and union,"W nothing in that jurisprudence requires that an
independent fair representation claim contain a concomitant claim of
employer breach. Similarly, potential bifurcation of claims between court
and NLRB does not diminish independent federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1337(a) for the fair representation claim which arises from the
NLRA grant of exclusive representational status. Further, bifurcation
does not give the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over "any fair
representation suit whose hypothetical accompanying claim against the
employer might be raised before the Board."'"
The six-month unfair labor practice charge limitations period of
section 10(b) of the NLRA applies to section 301 employee suits against
the employer for breach of contract, or against the union for breach of the
duty of fair representation. 105 Departure from state limitations periods is
deemed appropriate since federal law provides a closer analogy, and the
federal policies at stake and practicalities of litigation make that rule "a
significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."1"6
B. Apportionment of Damages
We have seen, in Vaca v. Sipes,' that the Supreme Court
continued to subject union representational conduct to judicial scrutiny,
but simultaneously placed substantive and procedural limitations on the
scope of that review. Vaca further circumscribed union exposure under
the duty of fair representation by making clear that the union is not
required to pay the employer's share of the damages.
In the typical situation, the employer triggers the controversy by
breaching the contract, and the union aggravates the problem by breaching
102. 493 U.S. 67 (1989).
103. See infra pp. 13-14.
104. 493 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1989).
105. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). See West
v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987) (service need not occur within six-month limitations period).
Compare UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (section 301 suits generally
governed by state statutes of limitations). See generally Daniel G. Gallagher & Peter A.
Veglahn, The Statute of Linitations Period in Duty of Fair Representation Cases: A
Clarification, 38 LAB. L.J. 776 (1987).
106. 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
107. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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its duty to fairly process the grievances. Vaca held generally that liability
is to be apportioned between the employer and union according to the
damage caused by their respective fault. "Thus, damages attributable
solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the
union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's refusal
to process the grievance, should not be charged to the employer."",
Applying these principles to the wrongful discharge situation in Vaca, the
Court found that the union's failure to resort to arbitration did not exempt
the employer from full contractual damages. Assuming the union
breached its duty, all or almost all of the employee's damages were
attributable to the wrongful discharge. Accordingly, a damage award
against the union was improper.
Subsequently, however, in Bowen v. United States Postal
Service,"09 the Supreme Court held that a union may be held primarily
liable for that portion of a wrongfully discharged employee's damages
caused by the union's breach of its duty of fair representation."0 Bowen
warrants extended discussion here, for it graphically illustrates the
somewhat convoluted operation of the duty of fair representation. The
trial court found that the employee was discharged without just cause, and
that the union had handled the apparently meritorious grievance in an
arbitrary and perfunctory manner; that both the union and the employer
acted in reckless and callous disregard of the employee's rights; that the
employee could not have proceeded independently of the union; and that
the employee would have been reinstated had the union arbitrated the
grievance. The trial court ordered that the employee be reimbursed
$52,954 for lost benefits and wages. The trial court approved the jury's
apportionment whereby the union was responsible for $30,000 of the
employee's damages, and ordered the employer to pay the remaining
$22,954.
In explaining to the jury how liability might be apportioned, the
trial court indicated that the jury equitably could base apportionment on
the date of a hypothetical arbitration decision, the date when the employer
would have reinstated the employee if the union had fulfilled its duty.
The trial court suggested to the jury that the employer could be liable for
damages before that date and the union could be liable for damages
thereafter. The employee was discharged on March 13, 1976. The trial
108. Id. at 197-98.
109. 459 U.S. 212 (1983).
110. See generally Lea S. VanderVelde, Making Good on Vaca's Promise:
Apportioning Back Pay to Achieve Remedial Goals, 32 UCLA L. REV. 302 (1984). See
also, Richard Kirschner & Martha Walfoort, The Duty of Fair Representation: Implications
of Bowen, 1 THE LAB. LAWYER 19, 31-37 (1985).
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court found that if the grievance had been arbitrated, the employee would
have been reinstated by August 1977, and lost wages after that date were
thus deemed the fault of the union. The trial court acknowledged that
while the employer had set the case in motion by the discharge, the
union's actions upon which the employee reasonably relied delayed the
reinstatement, and it was thus a proper apportionment to assign fault to
the union for approximately two-thirds of the period the employee was
unemployed until the time of trial.
The Supreme Court held that apportionment of the damages was
required by Vaca, in light oi the trial court's findings that the damages
sustained by the employee were caused initially by the employer's
unlawful discharge and were increased by the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation. The Court did not decide whether the trial court's
instructions or its apportionment of damages were proper, because the
union objected to the instructions solely on the ground that no back pay at
all could be assessed against the union. Nor did the Court consider
whether there were degrees of fault, since both the employer and the
union were found to have acted in reckless and callous disregard of the
employee's rights.
The dominant concern, said the Court, is the injured employee's
right to be made whole because of both the employer's and union's
breach. While the employer should not be shielded from the natural
consequences of its action because of the union's wrongful conduct, the
union's breach of its duty and not employer fault precluded remedial
action through the grievance procedure. "The fault that justifies dropping
the bar to the employee's suit for damages also requires the union to bear
some responsibility for increases in the employee's damages resulting
from its breach. To hold otherwise would make the employer alone,
liable for the consequences of the union's breach of duty.""'
The Bowen Court noted Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,"=
where it had held that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation
would remove the bar of finality from an arbitral decision, in part because
a contrary rule would preclude employee recovery even where the union
had corrupted the arbitration process.
It would indeed be unjust to prevent the employee from
recovering in such a situation. It would be equally unjust to
require the employer to bear the increase in the damages caused
by the union's wrongful conduct. It is true that the employer
discharged the employee wrongfully and remains liable for the
111. 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983).
112. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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employee's backpay. . . . The union's breach of its duty of fair
representation, however, caused the grievance procedure to
malfunction resulting in an increase in the employee damages.
Even though both the employer and the union have caused the
damage suffered by the employee, the union is responsible for the
increase in damages and, as between the two wrongdoers, should
bear its portion of the damages."
The Bowen Court found that apportionment of the damages would
increase the incentive for both parties to comply with the grievance
procedure, noting that a contrary rule of total employer liability might
affect the willingness of employers to agree to common arbitration
clauses. The Court found that apportionment would not impose on the
union a burden inconsistent with national labor policy, but rather "will
provide an additional incentive for the union to process its members'
claims where warranted. . . . This is wholly consistent with a union's
interest. It is a duty owed to its members as well as consistent with the
union's commitment to the employer under the arbitration clause." 4 The
Court noted further that an award of compensatory damages will normally
be limited and finite, and that the union's exercise of discretion is shielded
by the standards requisite to proof of a breach of the duty of fair
representation.
C. Other Remedial Considerations
The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may not be
awarded for breach of the duty of fair representation.s Punitive damage
awards could deplete union treasuries, as well as compel unions to process
frivolous claims or resist fair settlements. The fundamental purpose of
unfair representation suits is compensatory.
In Teamsters, Local 391 v. Terry,1 6 the Court held that the
Seventh Amendment entitled employees to a jury trial on their claim for
compensatory damages (lost wages and health benefits) against their union
for breach of the duty of fair representation. (The claim arose from
special seniority agreements for drivers involved in a series of layoffs and
recalls and the union's declination to process certain grievances to the
grievance committee level on the ground that the issues were determined
in prior committee proceedings.) While the search for an historic analog
reveals a fair representation claim is both legal and equitable in nature,
113. 459 U.S. 212, 222 (1983).
114. Id. at 227-28.
115. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
116. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
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the particular money damages remedy is legal in nature. The back pay
sought was neither restitutionary nor incidental to injunctive relief, but
represented wages and benefits otherwise due from the employer, not
money wrongfully withheld by the union. Back pay relief under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,17 which the Court has characterized as
equitable,"' was distinguishable since such back pay was specifically
deemed "equitable relief" by Congress and was restitutionary in nature.
(The Court assumed, but did not decide, that Title VII plaintiffs are not
entitled to jury trials.) NLRA back pay relief was also distinguishable
since the duty of fair representation concerns individual not public wrongs
and therefore "vindicates different goals. "119
V. APPLICATION OF THE DoCTRINE
Steele-Vaca spawned a host of progeny, and fair representation
cases became over time a predominant aspect of federal labor law
litigation.'" While the focus of this article is Supreme Court
jurisprudence, discussion may be informed if not sharpened by a brief
overview of fair representation issues which have occupied the federal
courts.rn
Consistent with the early Railway Labor Act (RLA) cases such as
Steele, the courts have consistently held that union action predicated upon
racially discriminatory (or other invidious) motivation constitutes a breach
of the duty of fair representation. Union misrepresentation rooted in sex
discrimination is equally unlawful. The courts have held that unions
breach their duty of fair representation in a variety of situations where the
unions' actions are essentially based upon or in retaliation against
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) etseq. (1982).
118. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-18 (1975).
119. Chauffers, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339,
1349 (1990).
120. See generally Mayer G. Freed, Daniel D. Polsby & Matthew L. Spitzer, Unions,
Fairness and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 461 (1983); THE
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION (JEAN T. McKELvEY ed. 1977); THE CHANGING LAW OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION (Jean T. McKelvey ed. 1985); Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of
Fair Representation: What the Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 89 (1985); David
L. Gregory, A Call for Supreme Court Clarification of the Union Duty of Fair
Representation, 29 ST. LOUIS L.J. 45 (1985); Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair
Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1985); Lea S. VanderVelde,
A Fair Process Model for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079
(1983); Jonathan S. Willett, Evolving Standards for Duty of Fair Representation Cases
Under Section 301, 62 DEN. L. REV. 627 (1985).
121. For compilations of cases reflecting this overview see CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1319-1343 (2d ed. 1983) and 3D SUPP. 480-83 (1982-86).
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statutorily protected employee activities. Thus, for example, the union
may not base its action upon such irrelevant or invidious considerations as
the unit employee's nonmembership in the union, the unit employee's
intraunion activity, nor the unit employee's having filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) or other agencies. The courts
have also held that a union breaches its duty of fair representation when
its discriminatory actions are predicated upon the basis of political
expediency. Principles of bargaining unit majority rule do not defeat the
duty of fair representation. Unexplained union action has also been found
unlawful.
While a union may lawfully exercise reasonable discretion in
refusing to pursue a grievance, once the union undertakes the case, the
union must act fairly as the grievant's advocate. The duty is deemed
analogous to that between legislator and constituent rather than attorney
and client. A union breaches its duty of fair representation when it
handles a grievance in a perfunctory manner. When a union summarily
accepts an employer's uncorroborated assertions or shifting employer
reasons concerning a grievant's conduct, for example, fails to consult with
the grievant, or fails to investigate and consult with the employer
concerning a grievance, the union's conduct is found to be perfunctory.
As already noted, the Supreme Court recently endorsed the
prevailing view that mere negligence is not a breach of the duty of fair
representation. m  Intentional misconduct, however, clearly violates the
duty of fair representation. Deliberate concealment of material facts, for
example, is clearly regarded as inconsistent with the duty. Aggravated or
gross negligence, gross mistake, or reckless disregard, may in particular
circumstances violate the duty.
VI. REFLECTIONS ON THE DOCTRINE
The foregoing exegesis discloses that while the Supreme Court has
subjected union representational conduct to judicial scrutiny, it has
simultaneously placed significant procedural and substantive limitations
upon the scope of that review. Generally, as a precondition to any suit
against the employer for breach of contract, the employee must exhaust
(or attempt to exhaust) contractual grievance and arbitration procedures.
That dispute resolution process (i.e., arbitration award) will normally be
122. United Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. 1904, 1907 (1990).
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final and binding,'" and will preclude an independent suit by the employee
against the employer. The employee's suit is not bared by the exclusive
contractual procedures, however, where the union has breached its duty of
fair representation.'
Further, union breach of the duty of fair representation, which
would remove the exclusivity of the grievance and arbitration procedure
and open the employer to court suit, is not established merely by showing
union error or a meritorious grievance. There must be arbitrary,
discriminatory, or bad faith union conduct. Stated differently, the fact
that the employer may indeed have violated the contract and wronged the
employee is not determinative. And, that proposition is often a hard pill
to swallow.
The following hypotheticals, reflective of daily labor relations
practices, highlight some of the significant boundaries and limitations of
fair representation doctrine:
(a) the union agrees the grievance is meritorious but declines to
investigate, process or arbitrate the grievance because of inadequate funds
(fair);
(b) the union agent agrees to process the grievance, completes the
grievance form, but forgets to file the grievance within contractual time
periods (fair);
(c) the union declines to arbitrate a sexual harassment grievance
after a majority of unit employees vote against further arbitration of any
such claim (fair);
(d) the union declines to arbitrate after a majority of unit
employees decide the grievance lacks merit (probably unfair);
(e) prior to arbitration of a discharge, the union and the employer
privately advise the arbitrator that grievant is a "bad apple" whom neither
123. The Court has long held that (1) courts should order arbitration absent positive
assurance that the arbitration clause does not cover the particular dispute; (2) arbitrators, not
courts, are to decide the merits of grievances; (3) courts are not to review the merits of
arbitration awards; and (4) courts should enforce arbitration awards which are not absolutely
beyond the pale. The grievance and arbitration machinery is at the heart of a system of
industrial self-government and the system will not function with inappropriate judicial
interference. See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). See generally Benjamin Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts; Afiermath of the
Trilogy, 9 UCLA L. REv. 360 (1962); Benjamin Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor
Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REv. 41 (1967); William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Afiennath of AT&T and
Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464 (1989); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MIcH.
L. REV. 1137 (1977).
124. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), made clear that preliminary judicial
determination of the question of the union's breach of its duty will therefore frequently be
required before the section 301 suit against the employer can proceed.
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would miss, but that the arbitrator should of course decide the case on the
merits (fair);
(f) the union assigns a novice attorney to handle the arbitration
hearing knowing (not knowing?) that employer counsel is experienced
(fair);
(g) union counsel declines to call grievant as a witness at the
arbitration hearing because counsel sincerely believes grievant's testimony
would be self-destructive (fair);
(h) union counsel advises the arbitrator off (on?) the record that
the case lacks merit but nevertheless vigorously presents grievant's
position at the hearing (fair);
(i) union counsel declines to awaken the arbitrator who falls asleep
during grievant's direct examination (fair);
6) union counsel visibly irritates the arbitrator by strenuously
objecting to employer counsel driving the arbitrator to the airport (fair);
(k) union counsel declines to file a post-hearing brief or make
closing argument at the hearing although employer counsel does both
(fair).
National labor policy has long been predicated upon the assumption
that workforce improvement in wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment, and thereby labor peace, would be achieved through a
collective bargaining system which necessarily encompassed strong
unions." s  Protection of collective employee organizational and
representational rights was predominant. Individual interests were
relevant but subservient to majoritarian principles. Combination,
informed by the overriding concept of unity of interest, was the
touchstone.S
Exclusivity principles give the union awesome power to control the
working lives and fortunes of the entire bargaining unit, balanced, says
125. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967): (*National
labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting
through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate
unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and
working conditions.") See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33, 42
(1937). See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
PoLICY (1950).
As stated in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962), the
NLRA was designed in part to protect "concerted activities ... to correct conditions which
modem labor-management legislation treats as too bad to have to be tolerated in a humane
and civilized society like ours."
126. See generally FOSTER RNEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (3d ed.
1966); HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR (1945); DAVID
MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR (1987); NELL I. PAINTER, STANDING
AT ARMAGEDDON, THE UNITED STATES, 1877-1919 (1987); SELIG PERLMAN, HISTORY OF
TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922); SELIG PERLMAN & PHILLIP TAFT,
HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932 (1935).
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national labor policy, by the duty of fair representation. Yet that duty
demands neither reasonableness nor fairness, merely lack of hostility, and
tolerates negligence. Moreover, the arbitral remedy is essentially
nonreviewable and preclusive. Collective bargaining processes, including
union coffers, must not be unduly burdened, answers national labor
policy, again somewhat unsatisfactorily, particularly for the nonconsenting
minority.
Implementing the perceived congressional scheme, the Supreme
Court, particularly the Warren Court,' has repeatedly underscored the
wide discretion and limited exposure to be accorded unions. The focus
has not been upon employer mistreatment but rather union response.
Vaca thus emphasized, for example, that the question was not whether the
evidence supported the employee's assertion that he had been wrongfully
discharged by the employer, but whether the union acted arbitrarily,
discriminatorily, or in bad faith in declining to arbitrate.Y'
While collective bargaining has been at the core of national labor
policy for the private sector, " only one-fifth of the private sector
workforce is unionized." With due regard to the limitations and failures
127. See generally Lee M. Modjeska, Labor and the Warren Court, 8 INDUS. REL.
LJ. 479 (1986).
128. The Court stated:
[]f a union's decision that a particular grievance lacks sufficient merit to
justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of fair
representation because a judge or jury later found the grievance
meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such grievances short of
arbitration would be seriously reduced. The dampening effect on the
entire grievance procedure of this reduction of the union's freedom to
settle claims in good faith would surely be substantial.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967).
129. Congressional endorsement of collective bargaining principles was further reflected
in recognition of organizational-bargaining rights for federal sector employees in Title VII of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 92 Stat. 1111, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7903 (1982).
Congress there declared that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil
service are in the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1982). See Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89 (1983). Many of the states made similar
determinations concerning the desirability of collective bargaining in the public sector. See
generally HARRY T. EDWARDS, R. THEODORE CLARK & CHARLES B. CRAVER, LABOR
RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR - CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1985).
130. Union Membership Down to 16.1 Percent, 136 (BNA) LAB. REL. REP. 174 (Feb.
18, 1991). Labor's ostensible decline is attributed to various factors including a changing
workforce, evolution of a service and distribution economy, domestic and global
competition, management antiunionism, union apathy and organizational ineptness, NLRB
and other governmental bias, and a resurgent spirit of individualism. See generally James B.
Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REv. 841 (1985); Charles B.
Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 633; Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private
Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (1986); A.H. Raskin, Organized Labor - A Movement in
Search of a Mission: Implications for Employers and Unions, 3 THE LABOR LAWYER 41
(1987); Theodore J. St. Antoine, National Labor Policy: Reflections and Distortions of
Social Justice, 29 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 535 (1980); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:
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of collective bargaining generally," therefore, if not also within that
unionized sector, courts and legislatures have increasingly sought to fill
the gaps with protective labor doctrine." Judicial and legislative erosion
of employment at will doctrine, for example, has provided civil causes of
action for wrongful discharge of nonunionized employees. m
In theory, a fundamental reason for and benefit of unionism is
employee protection against arbitrary management.tm  Not long ago the
generality reigned that management could discipline or discharge for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. The New Deal and its progeny of
social legislation made some inroads on this doctrine of unfettered
management by proscribing certain forms of discrimination (e.g., race,
sex, union activity). A major inroad, and concomitant breakthrough for
industrial due process, appeared to come with union success in negotiating
"just cause" requirements into labor contracts. In fact, however, as has
been seen, employer just cause is frequently not the touchstone, rather the
legitimacy of the union decision not to challenge that employer cause.
Under evolving employment law jurisprudence, predominately state
based, growing numbers of unrepresented employees have significant
avenues of civil recourse against their employers for unjust treatment
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769
(1983).
131. See generally THOMAS A. KOCHAN, HARRY C. KATZ & ROBERT B. McKERsIE,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986).
132. See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 10-11 (1988):
Why collective bargaining has not been more widely extended is, for
present purposes, unimportant. The significant fact is that collective
bargaining does not regulate the labor market. Unions and collective
agreements do not guard employees from the potential deprivations and
oppressions of employer economic power. The consequence is
foreseeable, if not inevitable; if collective bargaining does not protect the
individual employee, the law will find another way to protect the weaker
party. The law, either through the courts or the legislatures, will become
the guardian. Labor law is now in the midst of that changing of the
guard. There is current recognition that if the majority of employees are
to be protected, it must be by the law prescribing at least certain rights of
employees and minimum terms and conditions of employment.
See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE; THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw (1990); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in
the Next Half-Century, 61 CHI. KENT L. REV. 631 (1985).
133. See generally ANDREW D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE
DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE (1987); WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY &
MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1985); LEx K.
LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1988); HARRY H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (2d ed. 1987).
134. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1047 (7th
Cir. 1987), revd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988): "[O]ne of the major recruiting points of union
organizers [is] that unionization would protect the worker against arbitrary discharge."
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(e.g., wrongful discharge, sexual harassment). Recourse is generally
available without contractual or other exhaustion requirements, and
remedial relief is frequently broad, including compensatory and punitive
damages. While there is hardly national uniformity in this burgeoning
crazy quilt of employment law, substantial protection is emerging for the
unrepresented/nonunion sector.
Evolving unjust treatment law does not benefit the represented
employee. Section 301 generally preempts claims arising under (i.e., just
cause) or otherwise entailing the labor contract. One hard question
concerns, the fairness of this ostensible disparity. Limited arbitral
remedies, such as reinstatement and mitigated back pay, pale before the
huge compensatory and punitive damage awards noted in the civil advance
sheets. Further, no union agent holds the key to the courthouse door.
Conversely, formal, costly, cumbersome, and protracted court
litigation is arguably no substitute for the informal, inexpensive, simple,
and expeditious relief available under the grievance and arbitration
procedures contained in most collective bargaining agreements. Further,
the labor arbitrator - not the court - has expertise concerning the
multifaceted dimensions of the employment community and the common
law of the shop. As Justice Douglas once noted, "The ablest judge cannot
be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon
the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed."' s  Perhaps again one is driven back to the concept that
assuming processes work fairly and efficiently, the greatest good for the
greatest number is derived from collectivism not individualism.
It is interesting to compare the nonexclusivity and nonpreclusivity
of contractual grievance-arbitration remedies under analogous social
legislation. The statutory right of an employee to a trial de novo under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19 6 4 ,36 for example, may not be
135. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization to engage in employment discrimination against any individual because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The nondiscrimination
prohibitions of Title VII apply to private and to public sector employment, including federal
employment. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Chandler
v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973).
Central administrative authority for the administration of Title VII with regard to
private sector and state and local public sector employment is generally vested in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Title VII provides that the EEOC is to
endeavor to resolve meritorious charges of unlawful employment practices within itsjurisdiction by the informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). If conciliation fails, the
aggrieved party, or the EEOC (in regard to charges of unlawful employment practices in the
private sector), or the attorney general (in regard to charges of unlawful employment
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foreclosed by the prior submission of the claim to final arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement.' A
prior arbitral decision neither forecloses an individual's right to sue nor
divests the federal courts of jurisdiction.
Employment discrimination claims may be pursued in several
forums, and parallel or overlapping remedies are contemplated. Title VII
supplements, and does not supplant, other laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination. The contractual and statutory rights have
legally independent origins and vindicate different policies, and both rights
are available to an aggrieved employee.
Nor is an employee's submission of a grievance to arbitration
regarded as a waiver of his cause of action under Title VII. The Supreme
Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, said that "[a]lthough presumably
an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a
voluntary settlement, mere resort to the arbitral forum to enforce
contractual rights constitutes no such waiver. " 3' The decision of the
arbitrator may be admitted into evidence in the Title VII action, and may
be given such weight as the court in its discretion deems appropriate.3 9
As summarized by the Gardner-Denver Court:
[t]he federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the
federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can
best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully
both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title
VII. The federal court should consider the employee's claim de
novo. The arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate."4 0
practices in the state and local public sector) may bring a de novo civil action in federal
district court. See Occidental Life Ins., Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1977);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974). See also Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1567 (1990) (state courts have inherent authority
and presumptive competence to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions). The
EEOC has no independent adjudicatory or enforcement authority.
General administrative authority over discrimination in federal employment is also
vested in the EEOC. The EEOC is given the authority to enforce the federal government
nondiscrimination prohibitions through appropriate remedial action, including hiring or
reinstatement with back pay. A federal government employee or applicant aggrieved by the
disposition of a discrimination complaint by a government agency (resort to the EEOC from
the employer agency is optional) or the EEOC may bring a de novo civil action in federal
district court. See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 829-32 (1976).
137. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
138. Id. at 52.
139. Id. at 60, n.21.
140. Id. at 59-60. The statutory period for filing a claim with the EEOC is not tolled
during the pendency of grievance or arbitration procedures under a collective bargaining
contract. International Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins &
Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1976). See generally Edwards, Arbitration of
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While a union might waive particular statutory rights related to
collective activity (e.g. strikes), 41' said the Gardner-Denver Court, Title
VII rights concern not majoritarian processes, but individual equal
opportunity, and are not waiveable. Moreover, neither arbitrators nor
arbitral fact-finding processes were as appropriate as judicial processes for
final resolution of Title VII issues. Arbitrators have expertise in shop,
not public law,"G and arbitral evidentiary and procedural rules are lax.'
0
Further concern with arbitral preclusivity arose from the union's
exclusive control over the grievance-arbitration process, the potential
subordination of individual to collective interests, and the difficulty of
establishing breach of the duty of fair representation. The Court thought
it noteworthy that Congress extended Title VII protection against union as
well as employer practices.
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc.,'" that an employee could bring a wage claim in
federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),14s
notwithstanding prior unsuccessful submission of the claim to a joint
grievance committee under the labor contract. Applying Gardner-Denver
principles, the Court found that the FLSA rights arose independent of the
collective-bargaining process, and devolved on employees "as individual
workers, not as members of a collective organization. "1, Accordingly,
the rights were not waiveable and were better protected in a judicial
forum. The Court stated:
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union Representatives, 27
LAB. ... 265 (1976); Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, 7he Arbitration of
Discrimination Grievances in the Afiermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J. No. 3, 49
(1984). Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process
and the Public's Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 724 (1976).
141. "These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of
bargaining," said the Court, "and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as
collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for unit members." Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). Title VII rights to equal employment were
no part of such collective bargaining process.
142. The arbitrator's "task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the
requirements of enacted legislation." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53
(1974). Where the contract and Title VII conflict, "the arbitrator must follow the
agreement." Id. at 57.
143. "Indeed," said the Court, "it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it
to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution." Id.
at 58. To permit employees to pursue fully both contract and court remedies also facilitates
settlement.
144. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1982).
146. Berrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981).
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Not all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited
for binding resolution in accordance with the procedures
established by collective bargaining. While courts should defer to
an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is based on rights
arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement, different
considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on
rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual workers."0
As in Gardner-Denver, the Court stressed that grievance-arbitration
preclusion could result in forfeiture of statutorily protected rights because
fair representation doctrine tolerated union failure to process even
meritorious claims,1" and arbitral incompetence or lack of contractual
authority to evaluate public law considerations."
Further, in McDonald v. City of West Branch,'s the Supreme
Court held that arbitration awards were entitled to neither res judicata nor
collateral estoppel effect in civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.m
"[A]lthough arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes...
it cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in
protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is
designed to safeguard. "
147. Id. at 737.
148. Id. at 742. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29
(1987). See generally William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards:
The Afiermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464 (1989); Bernard D.
Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy Defense, 10 IND. REL. L.J.
241 (1988).
149. The Court noted as follows:
Since a union's objective is to maximize overall compensation of its
members, not to ensure that each employee receives the best compensation
deal available, . . . a union balancing individual and collective interests
might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted wage and hour
benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative expenditure of resources would
result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a whole.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981).
150. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) accords a federal remedy for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." The statute reaches
federal statutory and constitutional claims. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988);
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). Relief is available where the statute creates specific
identifiable federal rights intended to benefit the putative plaintiff and Congress has not
expressly foreclosed relief. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. 418 (1987); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984); Middlesex County
Sewage Auth. & Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981). See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CmI. L. REv.
394 (1982).
152. 466 U.S. at 290.
THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Granted that Title VII, FLSA, and § 1981 analogies entail
accommodation of congressional schemes, the policy considerations which
underlay the Court's nonexclusivity determinations hardly seem confined
to statutory interpretation principles. Arbitral and fair representation
limitations and deficiencies arguably transcend particular claims. With
due regard to the unpopularity of the thought, one does occasionally
wonder whether aspects of exclusivity/fair representation doctrine have
become unnecessarily harsh on the individual employee. The inquiry
seems especially warranted in discharge and discipline cases entailing the
most fundamental of civil rights to and in employment.

